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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUBJECT Military Information: Former Japanese Fortifications in the Inner Mongolian Area of Manchuria

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1. Between 1943 and 1945, the Japanese Army built fortifications at Wangyehmiao (122-01, 46-05) and along the western approaches to Wangyehmiao and Taonan (122-47, 45-21), assuming that in time of war with the USSR the main Soviet force would advance into this region from the Bayan Tumen (114-30, 48-04) area to cut off the Ssupingchieh (124-22, 43-11)-Tsitsihar (123-57, 47-22) rail line while a smaller Soviet force would attempt to sever the Paichengtzu (122-52, 45-37)-Arshan (119-58, 47-12) railroad.
2. The Kosutenera (approximately 121-07, 45-32) fortified area, at the confluence of the Horen and Hundin Rivers, approximately 125 kilometers southwest of Wangyehmiao, and the three fortified areas in the vicinity of Uburin Jalaga (north of Baksonera, 120-37, 46-12), mid-way between Wangyehmiao and Solun (121-24, 46-41), comprised the key defenses to these strategic rail lines on the route of approach from the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR).
3. The construction of the Kosutenera fortification (see Attachment No. 1) was started in 1943 and was completed in the spring of 1945. The purpose of the fortification was solely to delay an advancing force, moving toward the Tsitsihar-Ssupingchieh rail line, from three to five days in order to allow troops in rear areas to mobilize; consequently, the fortifications were not extensive. In peacetime, one company of infantry was stationed at the fortification as observers. In wartime, one battalion of infantry, two field artillery companies, one anti-tank gun battalion and two heavy machine gun companies were supposed to man the fortification. At the time of the entry of the Soviet Army into Manchuria, there were no weapons or personnel at the fortification however.
4. The Kosutenera fortification had the following facilities:
 - a. Field artillery, anti-tank and heavy machine gun platforms. The artillery and anti-tank gun platforms were 75cm thick; the heavy machine gun platforms were 50cm thick. The weapons were not mounted in peacetime.
 - b. Barbed wire around important positions.
 - c. Telephone communications between the gun positions.
 - d. An automobile road from liaison between the positions.
 - e. A tunnel dug into the rock mountain for storing military supplies; it is large enough for vehicles to go in and out.

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5. The Kosutenera fortification had the following weak points:
 - a. There were no supporting air units based nearby.
 - b. The air raid defenses were inadequate.
 - c. The nearest supply base was at Wangyehmiao.
 - d. Advancing troops could by-pass the fortified area if they had engineer equipment.
6. The Uburin Jalaga fortifications (see Attachments 2, 3 & 4), constructed between 1942 and 1944, were built to halt temporarily troops moving toward the Paichengtzu-Arshan railroad. There were three fortified areas in this defensive setup: the first at Uburin Jalaga on the Guiler River, the second nine kilometers west of Uburin Jalaga along the Guiler River and the third about twenty kilometers west of the second fortification also on the Guiler River.
7. The facilities of these fortifications were similar to those of the Kosutenera fortified area:
 - a. Concrete platforms for field artillery, anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns.
 - b. Barbed wire around the positions.
 - c. Telephone communication between the gun positions.
 - d. Automobile roads for liaison between important positions.
 - e. Tunnels supply storerooms and tank traps along the vulnerable routes of approach.
8. The weak points of these fortifications were the same as those of the Kosutenera fortification.
9. The Wangyehmiao fortified area (see Attachment No. 5) was the key point in the Japanese defense line in Northwestern Manchuria because, if this strongpoint were broken through, the Tsitsihar-Ssuningchieh railroad would be severed, isolating troops in Tsitsihar, Hailar and Arshan. The Wangyehmiao fortification was not intended to be a sacrificial position, as those at Kosutenera and Uburin Jalaga, but was to employ an aggressive defense until the arrival of reinforcements. From the standpoint of terrain, this fortification was endowed with all the qualities necessary for such a plan.
10. The Wangyehmiao fortification facilities included:
 - a. Platforms for heavy 15cm guns.
 - b. Anti-aircraft, field artillery and anti-tank gun platforms.
 - c. Automobile roads between positions.
 - d. Barbed wire entanglements around the various positions.
 - e. Telephone communication to gun positions.
 - f. Tank traps along important routes of approach.
 - g. An airfield nearby with fighter and bomber plane support.
 - h. A huge tunneled air raid shelter and warehouse for military supplies.
 - i. A spur line to the fortifications from the Paichengtzu-Solun railroad which was partially completed.
 - j. The entire fortified area was built in a rocky mountainous area and all of the positions were cave-like and practically unexposed on the surface.
11. The Wangyehmiao fortification had the following weak points:
 - a. In places where steel and concrete should have been used, bamboo was substituted for the steel because of the difficulty of procuring steel.
 - b. The eastern sector of the fortification could not be strongly defended because of its topography and was extremely vulnerable to air attacks.
12. The following was the proposed disposition of troops in the Wangyehmiao fortified area:
 - a. East sector -- one infantry battalion
 - b. South sector -- two infantry battalions
 - c. Central sector -- three infantry battalions
 - d. West Sector -- three infantry battalions
 - e. North sector -- one infantry company
 - f. Two heavy gun battalions
 - g. Three field artillery battalions
 - h. Ten companies of anti-tank guns

The fortification was only eighty percent completed at the time of the Japanese surrender and there were no troops disposed in the various positions at that time.

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